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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
REPLY BRIEF
OF THE APPELLANT

Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
ERNESTO HERNANDEZ,

CaseNo.20020576-CA

Defendant and Appellant.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED
THAT MR. HERNANDEZ WAS GUILTY OF DRIVING UNDER THE
INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL WITH A PASSENGER UNDER THE AGE
OF SIXTEEN YEARS IN THE VEHICLE RATHER THAN THE CRIME
OF RECKLESS DRIVING.

In his opening brief Mr. Hernandez documented the appropriate rules
of statutory construction. The plain language contained within a statute is
to be interpreted as the intent of the statute unless an ambiguity exists within
the language. See Brief of Appellant, pages 10-13.
Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will
not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent. Rather, we are
guided by the rule that a statute should generally be construed
according to its plain language. ... When language is clear and
unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room
is left for construction.

Brendlev. City of Draper, 937 P.2d 1044, (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quotations
and citations omitted).
The Reckless Driving statute reads:
41-6-45. Reckless driving - Penalty.
(1) A person is guilty of reckless driving who operates a vehicle:
(a) in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property;
or
(b) while committing three or more moving traffic violations under
Title 41y Chapter 6, Traffic Rules and Regulations, in a series of acts
within a single continuous period of driving.
(2) A person who violates Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45 (2000)(emphasis added). Mr. Hernandez insists
that the language in 41-6-45(l)(b) is so plain on its face that any and all
moving traffic violations as pronounced by the legislature in Title 41,
Chapter 6 are expressly adopted as potential elements of the (l)(b) violation
if committed in a series of violations with two or more others.

The State

says that the DUI statute is somehow exempted from this plain reading of
the statute despite conceding that DUI is a moving traffic violation that falls
under Title 41, Chapter 6, of the Traffic Rules and Regulations section of the
code. Brief of Appellee at P. 10, text and n. 1.
In short, the State disagrees with the plain meaning encouraged by
Mr. Hernandez because it does not like the result. For example, the State
does not cite to any specific language within the statute which is somehow
or in someway ambiguous. Each of the result-oriented interpretations by

the State requires this court to reach beyond the plain language of the
legislature and contort a different meaning. None of the interpretations of
the State are justified first, because the language is unambiguous thereby
forbidding any new construction of the plain language; and second, the State
fails to provide any extended analysis, historic or otherwise, which supports
its position other than to impermissibly rewrite the statute and claim disdain
for the result. The statute does not require to be read in conjunction with
the DUI statute; the DUI statute is now an included part of the statute
provided the other two requisite violations are present as well.
The State says, "The defendant fails to explain how eliminating
prosecutions under Utah's DUI statutes would achieve securing the public's
safety." Brief of Appellee at 11. Neither Mr. Hernandez nor this Court is
required to address this contention of the state. The legislature wrote the
statute; if the plain meaning of the statute is something other than that which
is desired, then the legislature can rewrite the statute as is their prerogative.
As discussed in Mr. Hernandez' opening brief, our Utah Supreme Court has
addressed this very issue in a Shondel analysis in 1985. There the Court
stated:
This Court does not declare statutes unenforceable or unconstitutional
because they could have been better drafted; indeed it has long been
the law that we attempt to construe statutes to be constitutional. Nor
are we concerned with legislative policy decisions embodied in
statutes. Nevertheless, we cannot disregard our responsibility to
assure the rational and evenhanded application of the criminal laws.
Equal protection of the law guarantees like treatment of all those who

are similarly situated. Accordingly, the criminal laws must be written
so that there are significant differences between offenses and so that
the exact same conduct is not subject to different penalties depending
under which of two statutory sections a prosecutor chooses to charge.
That would be a form of arbitrariness that is foreign to our system of
law. The Legislature may make automobile homicide committed
recklessly either a misdemeanor or a felony, but it cannot make the
crime both a felony and a misdemeanor, leaving the choice to the
prosecutor as to whether he charges a felony or a misdemeanor.
State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 263 (citations omitted). See extended
argument in Brief of Appellant at 15-16.
This Court should resist the result-oriented interpretations provided by
the State to affirm the trial court's erroneous decision, undoubtedly equally
motivated by the same desire to read a contrary result into an otherwise
clearly articulated statute. This Court should reverse and remand the
Hernandez matter to the lower court to enter a sentence on the Reckless
Driving violation as clearly indicated in the statute.

POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE
SHONDEL LINE OF CASES DID NOT REQUIRE THAT MR.
HERNANDEZ' CONVICTION BE ENTERED FOR THE LESSER
PUNISHED CRIME OF RECKLESS DRIVING.

The State of Utah claims that Shondel does not apply because the
traffic offenses of Reckless Driving and DUI have different elements.

A

review of both statutes prior to the 2000 amendment would likely support

d

the claim of the state. However, this claim inarguably fails when applied to
the current language of § 41-6-45(l)(b). The statute now reads as follows:
41-6-45. Reckless driving - Penalty.
(1) A person is guilty of reckless driving who operates a vehicle:
(a) in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property;
or
(b) while committing three or more moving traffic violations under
Title 41, Chapter 6, Traffic Rules and Regulations, in a series of acts
within a single continuous period of driving.
(2) A person who violates Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45 (2000)(emphasis added).

In section (l)(b) the

legislature has expressly made each and every moving violation in Title 41,
Chapter 6, as a crime and an element of reckless driving.1 Once any three of
those offenses are established then the three offenses merge together to
create a reckless driving charge. As indicated above, DUI is not exempted
from this statute. The States argument refuses to recognize that the DUI
statute, in its entirety, is an included offense just as are all other traffic
offenses from Title 41, Chapter 6. Their position to the contrary is without
merit. Because DUI, on the facts of this case, is an element of the new
reckless driving offense of subsection (l)(b), Shondel most certainly applies
and the lower punishment of a B misdemeanor necessarily applies.

1

The State of Utah concedes that DUI is a moving traffic violation within 41-6.
Brief of Appellee at 10.
*

POINT III. REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
The State incredulously states that oral argument would not
significantly aid the Court in deciding the case. Mr. Hernandez disagrees.
Rule 29 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure delineates that "oral
argument will be allowed in all cases unless the court concludes: the appeal
is frivolous, the issue has recently been authoritatively decided, or that the
decisional process would not be significantly aided by the oral argument.
This issue has been determined to not be frivolous as indicated by the court's
decision to withdraw its motion for summary disposition after filing of Mr.
Hernandez' objection to that process. This newly amended Reckless
Driving statute has not yet been reviewed by the Court. Oral argument can
help to clarify the positions of the parties that are only briefly provided to
the court in these pleadings. Mr. Hernandez respectfully requests the
opportunity to address the Court and believes oral argument unquestionably
will aide the decisional process.

CONCLUSION

Appellant Ernesto Hernandez respectfully requests that this Court to
review the statutory construction issues and supporting Shondel argument
presented herein, and for all or any of the reasons stated, to correct the

decision of the trial court and reverse the conviction for Driving Under the
Influence and remand the matter for a new sentencing for the corrected
offense of Reckless Driving.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7^_ day of April, 2003.

BENJAMIN A. HAMILTON
Attorney for Appellant
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